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The failure of Page and Bacon illustrates the challenges 
confronting St. Louis merchants in the 1850s. The end 
of the Mexican War brought renewed migration and 
prosperity, while the telegraph and railroads promised 
to connect the distant markets faster than ever before. 
However, technology also brought increased competition. 
New men and money arrived from the East, and the city 
of Chicago rose to challenge St. Louis for the commerce 
of the Great West. Prosperity could still be interrupted by 
bank failures , and events in distant cities effected everyone 
in the marketplace faster than ever before. St. Louis 
merchants and bankers used commercial organizations 
to rationalize and lend stability to the marketplace, but 
despite modernization and greater organization, merchants 
were reminded that, like their hard-money opponents 
in the legislature, they were also unable to control the 
marketplace. 2 
Following the Panic of 1819, two competing ideas 
about how to maintain order in the marketplace emerged 
and became more sharply divided during Missouri's 
struggle to charter a state bank. Debates over relief laws, 
banking, currency, and government intervention were the 
beginning of a national debate in which different views of 
the market economy emerged. Neither camp had a clear 
vision of what lay ahead, but instead responded to events 
and changes based upon their experience and an imperfect 
knowledge of the events which they confronted. 
Bank failures following the panics of 1819 and 1837 
hardened anti-banking sentiment in Missouri, codified in 
constitution and law, leaving merchants in St. Louis to rely 
on private banking as they faced challenges to their trade 
routes after the Erie Canal opened in 1825. A branch of 
the Bank of the United States opened in 1829 but closed 
in 1836. The creation of a state bank in 1837 provided 
little in the way of needed credit or currency because 
of restrictions set by the state legislature, which was 
controlled by the hard-money faction of the Democratic 
Party. Those who tried to restrict banking and paper money 
were working to take control of the marketplace as a 
means of restraint. Others, whom I am calling merchants, 
A shortage of specie-gold and silver-and money shortages marked the Panic of 1837, as the signs on the banks in this 
cartoon suggest. Differing views on the Panic are seen here-drunken "Locofoco" members, laborers out of work, wealthy 
investors giving alms to a woman with a child. In St. Louis, larger specie deposits from the Santa Fe trade initially reduced 
the impact of the Panic. (Image: Library of Congress) 




The aftermath of the White Cloud steamboat fire in May 1849 and its destruction of some nine city blocks and 400 
buildings provided St. Louis an opportunity to create a new physical environment to reflect its changing business priorities 
at mid-century. Among those was construction of the new Merchants Exchange on Third Street at Chestnut. Having such 
an Exchange was part of a broader effort by St. Louis businessmen to transform St. Louis into a major metropolitan area . 
(Image: Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper) 
had a better, though imperfect, understanding that the 
market could not be restrained and worked to continue its 
operation, to maintain order within the marketplace. Each 
side in this contest was working to impose its ill-defined 
vision of order in the marketplace. 
Merchants were pressed as hard by the market economy 
as any small farmer or laborer might have been. Even 
local business was competitive, but, it was hampered by 
political opponents who worked to restrict banking and 
by transportation developments which made it easier to 
participate in the market economy, but also brought a new 
inter-city competition with rival merchants in Chicago. 
The organizations they created contributed to a more 
orderly marketplace, but as they responded to the approach 
of railroads from the east, merchants built a new order that 
displaced the old.3 
The return of prosperity in the late 1840s and rebuilding 
after a massive fire in 1849 helped to consolidate existing 
commercial organizations. The Chamber of Commerce, 
the St. Louis Exchange, and the Miller's Exchange merged 
into one, calling itself the St. Louis Merchants Exchange. 
Unlike the city-owned marketplaces or small shops where 
vendors sold their wares directly to consumers, the new 
Exchange was instead a place for larger scale merchants 
engaged in the wholesale business.4 
From the 1850s on, the Exchange took on a greater 
utility, and city merchants showed a greater interest in 
its operation. The permanent advent of the Merchants 
Exchange, with its constitution adopted in January 1850, 
was a structural separation in the local marketplace that 
created a two-tiered organization where one level was 
political and the other solely for conducting business. 
Membership in the Exchange conveyed the privilege of 
doing business on the trading floor, but governance and 
leadership were restricted to members of the Chamber 
of Commerce, who served on committees and voted for 
officers and on the admission of new members. By 1860 
there were over 600 members in the Exchange and 200 
members in the Chamber who were able to participate in 
its government. 5 
The Constitution with Rules and By-Laws established an 
arbitration process that was faster and more efficient than 
the state court system, and fellow businessmen ruled on 
the case rather than a randomly selected jury drawn from 
the community at large. Merchants could still take their 
chances in court; however, surviving records show that 
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merchants used the Arbitration and Appeals committees 
repeatedly to resolve disputes arising in business. 6 
Merchants were unable to control entry to the 
marketplace but instead used the organization to 
collectively judge behavior and expel those whose 
business practices were considered inappropriate. One 
surviving account of the politics within the Chamber and 
the Exchange indicates that it was a place of relative amity, 
and the elections for committees and officers suggest 
that control of the organization rotated every few years 
among factions within the merchant community, which 
assured that anyone could be assured of a fair hearing, 
and that no one person or group could take control of the 
organization .7 
Information helped to rationalize the marketplace, which 
was made easier to obtain by the telegraph, improved 
transportation, and steam-driven press. By the mid 1850s 
city merchants were apprised daily of local, national, and 
international market conditions. National publications 
kept merchants apprised of conditions in other cities, but 
merchants also needed information on local and regional 
developments. The Exchange collected information on 
local developments such as the arrival of steamboats and 
their cargoes. They also published a Price Current and 
allowed representatives from city newspapers access, thus 
ensuring wider publication on events in the market. 8 
Although merchants created an alternate governing 
structure for the marketplace, they did not see the market 
economy as separate from society. What was good for 
business, an 1852 annual report claimed, was good 
for the city. Personal profit was their goal but also the 
"growth, wealth, and permanent prosperity of our city." 
Trade, commerce, and manufacturing were so "intricately 
interwoven" into the life of the city, the writer claimed, 
that it was impossible to separate them.9 
A third level appeared in the local marketplace in 1856 
when a group of merchants and bankers chartered a private 
corporation and erected a modem building which they 
leased to the Exchange and Chamber of Commerce. All 
of the stockholders and directors of the company were 
at the top of the city 's business community and could be 
classified as financiers and capitalists. Although they were 
of different political beliefs, they set politics aside in order 
to do business and were united in defense of their city 
against northern and eastern rivals . These same men took 
the lead in bringing railroads to St. Louis as they worked 
to stay ahead of their rising northern rival, Chicago. 10 
Organization helped to rationalize the marketplace and 
to make the market economy function more smoothly, 
but business still needed the credit and money issued by 
banks over which the hard-money Democrats exercised 
control, or thought they did. As state banking and 
currency laws became more restrictive, merchant-bankers 
in St. Louis adapted first by relying on local insurance 
companies to issue paper money, until the legislature 
threatened to revoke their charters. Private banks then 
issued checks drawn on their specie reserves, known as 
"promises to pay," and later invested in note-issuing banks 
located in neighboring Illinois. As long as their notes 
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remained convertible to specie, they were legal tender, 
and Missouri 's legislature had no power to prohibit their 
circulation. That fact left private bankers relatively free to 
conduct business and kept the marketplace operating, but 
this freedom to trade and issue currency brought its own 
problems. 11 
The capital business was ruthlessly competitive as local 
bankers raided each other's specie reserves by collecting 
outstanding banknotes and presenting them for payment. 
The combination of domestic legislative hostility, out-of-
state banking, and fierce competition created a financial 
system that was both inadequate and unstable. Although 
the hard-money Democrats prided themselves on a state 
bank that issued little paper money and maintained high 
specie reserves, by the 1850s the economy was too far 
advanced to depend on hard-money alone. Railroads 
required greater pools of capital than steamboats or 
canals ever had, and for St. Louis to protect its place in 
the West it would have to become the railroad hub of the 
Mississippi Valley. In order for that to happen the city 
required more than an ad hoc financial system. 12 
In June 1852, a group of private bankers formed the St. 
Louis Board of Bankers and Exchange Dealers, which 
attempted to bring order to the local financial market. The 
Board was first suggested by Daniel D. Page who, with his 
son-in-law Henry D. Bacon, opened a St. Louis bank in 
1848, then in 1850 opened a branch in San Francisco. By 
1852 Page, Bacon and Company was the "most powerful 
and conspicuous" private bank in each of the two cities. 
Although stopping specie raids was not listed in the 
articles, it was likely that goal may have been the primary 
reason for the group's creation . 13 
The Board established interest and exchange rates and 
rather than use the power of the state to prohibit unreliable 
paper money, the bankers relied on the logic of the market 
to determine safe currency. Available information made it 
possible for local bankers to reject those notes which were 
unreliable, and merchants, shopkeepers, and employers 
would be forced to follow suit, eventually driving them 
from circulation . In protecting themselves from the 
worthless banknotes, the Board protected everyone 
engaged in the marketplace, and all who were subject to 
the market economy. 14 
In a rapidly growing city, bankers and merchants both 
faced a problem of reliability in selecting those with whom 
they did business or extended credit. By 1850, over half of 
St. Louis residents had been there less than two years, and 
long-time merchants, according to one newspaper, were 
"surrounded by thousands of strangers whose character 
was unfamiliar." 15 Kinship and personal acquaintance 
were not always the best means of judging sound decision 
making or success in business. 16 William Tecumseh 
Sherman was induced to leave the army and manage the 
San Francisco branch for a St. Louis banking partnership 
entirely on the word of a mutual acquaintance. Sherman 
proved to be worth his salt, but when Daniel Page sent his 
son to San Francisco to manage a branch bank there, the 
young man proved to be weak and indecisive. Two local 
partners conspired against the younger man, and Sherman 
Streets in the business district of cities like St. Louis looked much like this, with a mix of wagons and horses, small wooden 
business structures, and newer three-story buildings. (Image: State Historical Society) 
described one as "too fond of lager beer to be trusted with 
so large a business ." 17 
The Bankers Association established a rating system 
to determine who among the merchant community was 
worthy, but despite this and other advantages, the Board 
of Bankers and Exchange Dealers was short lived, lasting 
less than a year. In August 1852, only two months after 
its inception, Henry Bacon withdrew his bank, citing 
disagreements over commission rates on financial 
instruments. The Board continued meeting sporadically 
but finally disbanded in February 1853 and had been no 
more successful at controlling banking than its hard-money 
opponents in the state legislature.18 The 11 members of 
the Board controlled entry into the group; however, there 
is no record that anyone applied for membership after its 
founding, and there was no rule of exclusivity between 
members . St. Louis bankers and exchange dealers were 
trying to control the city's financial market at a time when 
capital was becoming concentrated in New York and 
beyond the control of a regional commercial city. 19 
Henry Bacon and Daniel Page were, however, 
not forthcoming about their reasons for leaving 
the organization. The timing coincides with their 
announcement of taking a contract to build a section of 
the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, extending from St. 
Louis to Cincinnati . Bacon was also the leader in a group 
of St. Louis investors building a short railroad connecting 
the city to coal mines in Illinois some 20 miles away. 
In September 1852, he took on the additional burden of 
extending the railroad across the state to meet the O & 
M, which would give St. Louis a rail connection to the 
east coast via Cincinnati and challenge the links existing 
to Chicago. In taking the contract, Bacon over-extended 
his bank; minutes from the Bankers Association indicate 
that he was beginning to experience financial problems 
two and a half years before his bank finally went under. 
The evidence indicates that Henry Bacon was doing all 
he could to maintain high cash flows , which went into the 
railroad.20 
Bacon's problems were made worse by events in San 
Francisco. He constantly pressed his branch there to 
send gold to his bank in New York which allowed him to 
maintain credit and "gave him a good name," but it was 
a circular system of money transfer from the California 
gold fields to New York, then to St. Louis. From there 
Bacon paid the contractors on the railroad until they went 
bankrupt, and he had to buy materials and pay the workers 
directly to continue progress. A collapse in the San 
Francisco speculative bubble caused by large-scale fraud 
committed by a city businessman weakened his western 
branch. By late 1854, Bacon 's desperate need for capital 
was a barely kept secret, and when the collapse came in 
January 1855, William Sherman claimed that they had 
all finally reached " the Niagara [Falls]" that no one had 
foreseen when he entered the banking business two years 
prior. 21 
The failure of Page and Bacon in 1855 showed that more 
information, improved transportation, and organization 
made the market operate more efficiently, but they also 
bound everyone in the marketplace more tightly together. 
Bacon's position as the leading banker in two cities made 
many others dependent on him to continue their own 
businesses. Mechanics and tradesmen lost whatever wages 
they were owed. As Sherman observed in San Francisco, 
"the most noisy and clamorous were men and women 
who held small certificates [ of deposit]" in his bank. 
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~ The ONLY Broad Gauge Railroad in the West ! "1l!lr' 
COMFORT !-BROAD GAUGE SALOON CARS ! THROUGH FROM CINCINNATI TO ST, LOUIS WITHOUT CHANGE, 
Trains leave New York as follows : 
NEW YORK & EBIE R.R. Foot Duane 11. 6 & 9 a .m. · 5 p.m. 
Via Dunkin; or Buffa.la, Olneland and CinclnnatL 
"HUD. RIV. & N. Y. C. R .R . '\-"::~' ~ .d 6 :00 a.m. 12 m. 5:15 p .m. 
Via Bnfllllo, Oleveland amt Cincinnati. 
CAMDEN & AMBOY R .R. Foot CorUandt 11. 8 a .m. 11 a .m. 4 & 6 p .m, 
By the P1:nuyln n ia R.R. 't'ia Pitta burg, Oolumbut: &. Clncinnali, and by the Ba.ltlmou &: Ohio R .R. via W hcelinr, Columbla: 
and.Oinclnnatt,or'ria Parkeniburf, Marietta and Cincinnali. 
PEOPLE'S LINE STEAMERS, Foot or Courtlandt st. 6:00p.m. 
Passengers by either the above Routes connect at Cincinnati with Ohio & Miss. RR-
I-'or Seymour and Louisville. Vincennes nncl Evansville, Sandov n.l n.nd Cairo, imJ. St. Louis. 
TH ROUCH FROM CINCINNATI TO ST. LOUIS W ITHOUT CHANCE OF CARS ! 
Only ONE CHANGE OF CARS between CINCINNATI, LOUISVILLE, EVA.NSVJLLE, or CAIRO. 
The Cincinnati and St Louis Route connects at St Louis wit: the 
. PACIFIC RAll ROAD and MISSOURI RIVER PACKETS 
FOR ALL PLACgS I:-1 
KAN S AS & NEBRASKA. 
CONNEC'l'S AT S '.l'. LOUIS WI'l'H 
, PACh."E'J.' S'J.'EA!II E R S for l!lcmpbi~, Vicksbnrg , Natcllez & New Ol"lcaus. 
Also CONNECTING nt CA.IBO with &TEAMERS for lfomphis , Vicksburg, Natchez&; New Orlcnns. 
-~ DAILY TRAINS LEAVE CI:NCINNATI 
At 9 A.M. and 7•1.B P.M. 
'l'Bil0UClll F ROM CINCINNATI '!'0 ST. L0TJIS, WT'l'H0IJT CHANGE Ob' CAJlS. 
One Train on ~unday at 7.15 o'clock, P .M., tl1 rough from Cincinnati t-0 St. Louis, without chnngc of Ca.rs. 
pt- ASK F OR TICKETS V IA CINCINNATI AND O HIO & M ISSISSIPPI R AI L R OAD. 
Pat•e as l o ic as by any o tliet• route. 
THROUGH TICKETS nl New York by this relinble nnd comfortable Route enu be procured al Ille fo llowing plnces: 
. OIDcti Coot. Dua n e St. P ENNSYLVANIA R.lt, Office, l'i o , 2 A.nor 'tlo uae. 
N. YORK 1.'- E RJE Onll'e&, 170, 1U3 .. 11.: 240 B l"Oftdwa y , a nd I DALT, & 0. H.10 R.R. Oltlce, 229 Brond,va y , eo r . D. a~t,, y a t , 
N' , V, CENTRAL Offlee, 207 llron1lway, eor. Fn.110 11 ■t. SPAUT..D ING•8 EXPRESS Office, 267 B ron1hv11y. 
H UDSON RIVEil lt,R. Depot, Ch n.m be~ at . PEO P LE'S Lt .. VE STEAMERS, foot Con.rtlnud t. lit • 
.ISAAC WYMAN, P . W . STRADER, 
Gen' l Wef3tem Agent 0. & M. R.R. , St . Loui s. Gcn' l 'l'icket Agent O & M. RR , Cincinn'\ti. 
-VV-. F.I:. O LElMEl:J:srT , G e n.'l S "l,1.p't. 
St. Louis businessmen were no different than those in other cities with strong manufacturing and merchant economies in that 
they actively promoted railroads to connect them to markets more efficiently. The Ohio and Mississippi Railroad spanned 
eastward from St. Louis to reach the Ohio River faster and cheaper than steamboats. (Images: Library of Congress and 
http://www.spellerweb.net/rhindex/USRH/BOmap 1876.jpg) 
Organizations helped to establish order for those who were 
engaged in the marketplace, but they could not calm a 
restless crowd of people who feared losing everything they 
had because of events over which they had no control. 22 
Routine, day-to-day transactions in the marketplace 
were increasingly impersonal, and familiarity with others 
in the marketplace was less common, but reputation was at 
times still important. The public pledge of financial safety 
worked once in St. Louis, but as Sherman observed, the 
same thing failed in San Francisco. People who came to 
his bank after the news of Page and Bacon's failure wanted 
to touch their money to be sure it was safe. Perhaps 
comparing the experiences of the two cities reflects on the 
volatility of the marketplace. The gold rush environment 
of San Francisco might have made any assurances 
impossible, while St. Louis was more settled in terms of 
its market relations; therefore, people were willing to be 
reassured .23 
Why did some business organizations succeed and 
others fail when they had similar methods- membership 
in the group, rate structures, and penalties for violations? 
Surviving records of the Chamber of Commerce indicate 
that members were willing to follow the findings of the 
Arbitration and Appeals Committees, while the Bankers' 
Association minutes show that from the beginning, 
member bankers violated the rules setting exchange rates. 
There was no incentive to go along with the organization's 
rules when non-members could undercut their competitors. 
It may come down to the size of the organization. By 
1860 the Merchants Exchange had over 600 separate 
businesses. The Bankers' Association never had more 
than 11 , and it operated in a regional commercial center. 
Such a small group could not successfully bring order to 
its level of the marketplace when there were many more 
in the banking business who were willing to undercut its 
attempts at control. 
The Merchants Exchange provided familiarity and 
a means of ascertaining character in the impersonal 
marketplace as it came to be the place to conduct business 
for merchants operating on the middle level. It was an 
imperfect system, but the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce 
and Merchants Exchange helped to establish order in 
the marketplace of one city. When connected to similar 
organizations in other cities, they began to establish order 
in the wider marketplace. 
Success or failure also depended on the separation 
into different levels in the marketplace. If a merchant in 
the Exchange failed, the repercussions were relatively 
mild. An individual merchant or partnership was part of 
a network involving others, but if one failed, the entire 
marketplace did not cease to function. However, the upper-
tier capital became concentrated in New York throughout 
the l 850s, making it impossible for a local organization to 
exercise control. As the local panics that beset St. Louis 
and San Francisco in 1855 showed, both involving Page 
and Bacon, bank failures had a far greater impact and the 
public responded accordingly. Disruptions in the upper 
level of the marketplace had ramifications in distant cities . 
The emerging capitalists were at the top, but their product, 
capital, was at the bottom, supporting everything else. 
Merchants created organizations that made the marketplace 
more orderly, but it could always be overturned. The logic 
of the marketplace forced them to respond to competitors 
in other cities, and in doing so, they created a new order in 
the marketplace. 24 
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